In the first week of May, the Kashmir region became the scene of a high-intensity aerial confrontation between the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The clash, triggered by terrorist attacks in Pahalgam and the subsequent Operation Sindoor launched by New Delhi, starkly revealed the real-world capabilities of aircraft and weapon systems in a modern beyond-visual-range (BVR) combat environment. The combination of J-10CE fighters armed with PL-15E missiles, integrated into a network of sensors and data links, allowed the PAF to gain a decisive tactical advantage, culminating in the confirmed downing of at least one Indian Dassault Rafale EH—the first of its kind lost in combat.

A Limited Retaliation, An Unexpected Response

India sought to punish terrorist organizations operating under the tacit protection of the Pakistani state apparatus without crossing the threshold into open war with its neighbor. The IAF conducted the strikes from "safe" distances, without entering Pakistani airspace, even in areas of Kashmir under Islamabad’s control. However, this caution did not prevent a swift and firm response: upon detecting the launches from Indian territory, the PAF command abandoned its defensive posture and adopted an offensive strategy aimed at denying airspace access to enemy fighters. This initiated a BVR engagement whose outcome would surprise both New Delhi and the world.

While the IAF reportedly hit nine designated targets during Operation Sindoor, the costs quickly began to mount. The spearhead of Pakistan’s response is said to have consisted of J-10CE fighters, closely followed by JF-17 Block III aircraft, all armed with PL-15E missiles. Operating from the safety of their own airspace and under the coverage of their SAM systems—which the IAF did not attempt to neutralize to avoid further escalation—Pakistani pilots launched barrages of long-range missiles. The result: between three and five Indian aircraft downed.

The official reconstruction of events released by PAF command claims five Indian aircraft were lost: one MiG-29UPG, one Su-30MKI, and three Rafales. However, since all the alleged shootdowns occurred on the Indian side of the Line of Control and under intense censorship imposed by New Delhi, only the loss of one Rafale EH and one Mirage 2000H has been visually confirmed and geolocated, leaving some uncertainty around the remaining claims. Interestingly, the PAF did not take credit for the Mirage kill.

According to the Pakistani Air Force spokesperson, at least 14 Rafale fighters were identified participating in the operation, and given the symbolic value India had placed on them—touting them as a "game changer" against Pakistan—the high command prioritized their neutralization. This, Islamabad claimed, explains the disproportionate number of Rafales among the downed aircraft. They even asserted that "more could have been shot down, but we chose restraint"—a claim I view with skepticism. If the goal was to deliver a devastating blow to India’s technological pride, it’s hard to believe they would have passed up the opportunity to down additional Rafales if they were within the effective range of the PL-15E. Most likely, the PAF shot down exactly those aircraft that were in vulnerable positions, without the margin to inflict more losses, even if they had wanted to.

In that sense, Pakistan’s victory—while tactically undeniable—must also be read through a propaganda lens. The outcome highlights weaknesses in the IAF’s planning and coordination, and underscores the effectiveness of China’s networked combat weapon systems. But it does not necessarily reflect a broad structural superiority between the two air forces or the aircraft models involved. Rather, it appears to be a case where Pakistan maximized its technical and doctrinal advantages in a favorable environment against an adversary that did not anticipate such a scale or sophistication of response.

The Missile Factor: How the PL-15E Defined the BVR Duel

In beyond-visual-range combat, having the longest-range missile not only allows one to shoot first but also to dictate the geometry, pace, and dynamics of the engagement. By launching first, the pilot can begin early defensive maneuvers—such as going cold, diving steeply to force the incoming missile through denser atmospheric layers, or turning toward friendly air defense coverage—thereby drastically reducing the probability of being hit. This advantage enables the pilot to re-engage the enemy with another missile while the opponent is still reacting or evading the first, maintaining pressure and initiative throughout the fight.

While the domestic version of the PL-15 is believed to have a range of nearly 200 km, the export variant used by the PAF has a published range of 145 km under ideal head-on interception conditions. Even at this reduced figure, it still represents a significant advantage over the IAF’s current air-to-air missile inventory, whose ranges are more limited:

• R-77 (RVV-AE): Up to 110 km, with operational versions possibly offering lower performance.
• MICA EM: Approximately 80 km in the radar-guided variant.
• Astra Mk1: Officially up to 110 km, though still in integration and limited production..

This differential allowed Pakistani fighters to fire from beyond retaliation range, set an asymmetric combat tempo, and retain tactical initiative. But the advantage wasn’t solely due to range: the PL-15E is also technologically superior. It features an active AESA radar seeker, providing better target discrimination and resistance to electronic countermeasures; a dual-pulse rocket motor that extends the acceleration phase and improves terminal energy; and a two-way data link that allows in-flight trajectory updates or target reassignment if the original is lost or destroyed. These features significantly increase the probability of kill in modern scenarios, where jamming and evasive maneuvers often degrade the effectiveness of older missiles.

The Invisible Multiplier: Sensors and the Data Network

Pakistan’s success in this unprecedented BVR engagement—a large-scale air battle involving over 100 aircraft and lasting nearly an hour—also stems from the robust surveillance, communications, and command infrastructure supporting its combat platforms. According to the official reconstruction released by the Pakistani Air Force (in contrast to India’s silence), the favorable outcome for Islamabad was the result of its refined "multi-domain combat doctrine," which emphasizes seamless integration among sensors, weapon systems, and operators. A key asset was the Swedish-built Saab 2000 Erieye airborne early warning and control aircraft (AEW&C), which extended the high command’s situational awareness and provided real-time information to patrolling fighters, improving their responsiveness and coordination in a highly dynamic environment.

The cornerstone of this integration was Pakistan’s national Link-17 data link, which enables the interconnection of combat platforms from diverse origins—such as the Swedish Erieye radar, American F-16s, and Chinese J-10CE and JF-17 fighters—into a unified and coherent tactical network. This net-centric warfare architecture provides critical advantages: it allows the construction of a real-time operational picture, facilitates dynamic target assignment, and grants decision-making superiority over adversaries with fragmented information flows or poor system interoperability.

Thus, while India deployed more than 70 aircraft, Pakistan operated around 40 but maximized their effectiveness through a network of sensors and data links that gave it information superiority, shared situational awareness, and the ability to fully exploit the strengths of the PL-15E missile. This weapon, with its extended range, advanced guidance, and data link, allowed the PAF to impose the rhythm of the engagement and establish the rules of combat across the operational theater.

Tactical Lessons and Geopolitical Implications

Just as the war in Ukraine has prompted a sweeping doctrinal reassessment within armed forces around the world, the recent aerial clash between India and Pakistan promises to become a key case study for understanding the evolution of beyond-visual-range combat in the 21st century. The scale, intensity, and technology involved offer abundant material to reassess tactics, training procedures, system interoperability, and technical requirements for future developments.

On the geopolitical level, the duel also marks a symbolic turning point: for the first time, a Chinese-developed weapons system—the J-10CE/PL-15E pair—has defeated a cutting-edge Western platform, the Dassault Rafale, in real combat. This event, supported by OSINT evidence and technical analysis, marks China’s entrance into the exclusive club of nations capable of designing, producing, and exporting weapon systems with proven performance in high-intensity scenarios

The impact of this demonstration goes beyond the military domain: it opens a window of opportunity for Beijing in the global arms market. Countries in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East—such as Egypt, which has already selected the J-10C for its air force—may now view China as a reliable, technologically advanced, and politically pragmatic supplier, capable of delivering high-performance solutions without the restrictive conditions often attached to Western arms deals.

Temas

• Pakistan Air Force
• Indian Air Force
• Rafale
• air to air missiles
• J-10
• PAF
• IAF
• JF-17 Block III

AUTOR

Gastón Dubois

Apasionado por la aviación, la historia, la política y la defensa. Editor-in-Chief en Aviacionline Defensa, combinando estos conocimiento para ofrecer un contenido valioso sobre temas estratégicos y de seguridad.

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